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There is probably a theorem dusting off its webs in a closet confining theoremsconcocted in White Hen Pantries, which says that given the exponential rate of
growth of information technology, the limited human ability to absorb will require
us to redefine the ways in which we process information. But since we could, if we
were so inclined, process ad infinitum without ever becoming appreciably more
informed about most things, we have chosen a more practical way of dealing with
our predicament. We have substituted our perennial pursuit of wanting to know
more (about what is irrelevant; it’s the wanting that counts) that the pursuit itself
has displaced the value we put on the information we unearth, if only because we
know that whatever we do uncover is either incomplete or has been replaced with
more up-to-the-microsecond information our technologies keep churning out, con-
fusing us, and cluttering our lives with the pointless.
The past, because of our callow indifference, counts for little. Not that we do not
remember it — we do, but fleetingly, and then we proceed to disgorge it to make
room for the new. In our Brave New World, the inexorable flood of information
transmogrifying our universe impels us to dismiss everything except the instanta-
neous flow of the instantaneous, thus consigning the past to an impermanence that
temporizes the search for anything that has meaning.
Sentiments, I think, best expressed by Thomas Barlow in a recent article in the
Financial Times:
Technology, with science its handmaiden, is now recognized as the pre-eminent driver
of development. The paradox: the very knowledge we acquire about the world increas-
ingly allows us to change it, and at changing it we seem particularly adept at making it
incomprehensible again.
How are democracies supposed to steer their way when the dominant force shaping
society  [technology/science] remains partly incomprehensible to so many of us? Put
another way: how can we be sure that we are controlling our technology and science,
rather than the other way round? How can we ensure that technology is not a driverless
cart, and science its runaway horse?1
Take the driverless cart and the presidential election we had last year. (Yes, we
had a presidential election!)  In particular, take Florida. In November and Decem-
ber, during the tumultuous days of the electoral recounts for president in the Sun-
shine state (remember? that is president, as in President of the United States) in case
you’ve moved on to other things, which will, if you have not, make you truly un-
American, we were inundated with the minutiae of chads, dimpled, pregnant, half
pregnant, hanging, or otherwise dangling in some precarious feat of acrobatic
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athleticism staving off the numerous attempts to shake them loose, thus reducing
their one privileged moment of national significance to naught. Every dot.com (yes,
they still existed then) worth its valueless stock provided us with the instantaneous
state of recounts polling station by polling station, with projections based on the
flimsiest data (projections were supposed to be a no-no at this point since the com-
petitive interests of networks to be the first to provide us with instantaneous results,
to be the first to “call” the election, were the cause of all the hullabaloo that fol-
lowed).
We were exposed to the mysteries of the butterfly ballot, of the role of the lepi-
dopterist in the voting system. We learned that hundreds of imperfectly designed
and outdated ballot-counting machines that belonged in scrap metal yards rather
than in polling stations spewed out thousands of perfectly valid votes because they
could not “catch” them. Pundits earned hundreds of thousands of dollars for indulg-
ing in small public bouts of self-flagellation. Constitutional scholars taught us that
they knew as much about the Constitution as our local bar hops. The Supreme Court
abrogated to itself the right to determine the outcome of a presidential election by
invoking every abstruse argument it could muster, but without ever citing the ar-
ticles of the Constitution that conferred this unique dispensation to it — which, to
be fair it couldn’t, since the Constitution contains no such articles.
Al Gore saved his best moment for the last, behaving like a bona fide candidate
only when the need to do so had become irrelevant and the nation “put the past
behind it,” as only the nation could, having elevated the practice to an art. And
when the dust had settled, after ten microseconds or so, we were instantaneously
immersed in the need to re-examine the way in which we conducted our elections so
that a Florida-like fiasco would never again insult the integrity of our electoral pro-
cess.
After 100-plus days in office, George W seems to be beating the expectations
odds; but since they were set at such a low level, this is not an accomplishment one
would rush to include in one’s CV. He is relaxed, laid back, charming, and becom-
ing a master of the art of self-deprecating humor. Meanwhile, he pushes ahead with
his agenda, dismantling many of Clinton’s programs, thumbing his nose at the Eu-
ropeans, upping the ante with North Korea and China, angering the Russians, but
making out with the Mexicans — we are about to enter the amigo era.
His tax cut of $1.6 trillion (a trillion is 1,000,000,000,000) is getting trimmed
back a little so that the well-off can look forward in time to absorbing 80 percent of
its benefits. His budget of $136 trillion, which he presented to Congress, will be
debated, not for the sum of its expenditures but for the priorities to which they are
directed. (If you want to bring a little perspective to things, look at it this way: Kofi
Annan, secretary-general of the UN, says that an expenditure of $15 billion for a
decade would save Africa from AIDS, save us from being spectators to Africa’s
slow slide off the face of the earth. And if you feel bad about that, you can buy
yourself a pair of Dolce & Gabbana blue jeans, with brooches and fringes, which
are held together on the seams by safety pins, for a piddling $2,222.)
George keeps to himself, is perhaps, the least visible president of the last forty
years, and whenever trouble looms, he reminds us that he is the education president,
the implication being that his compassion for our children always gets the better of
his conservatism, the latter being something he leaves to his henchmen who, like
Bush himself, are people of few words but increasingly let their actions speak for
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themselves. When their actions are deciphered they point in one direction: conserva-
tism is back with a bounce.
The Democrats are a little puzzled about this, since they were under the impres-
sion that given the circumstances in which he was elected, George W would reach
out to them in a spirit of bipartisanship. Wrong assumption. George governs as
though he carried every state, and while he does reach out to Democrats, it is to
shake their outstretched hands, not to reach policy accommodations, although he is
willing to give a little here and there: a little food on the doorstep keeps the wolves
from the door.
Not that there are discernible wolves out there. Clinton, never one to be underes-
timated, decided, on leaving office, to self-immolate. On good advice, he went to
India and Africa to empathize with the poor and lowly, and they have responded
with the usual outpourings of adoration, something to which our Bill is addicted.
The pardons issue lingers in the background — steely prosecutors, promises of im-
munity to potential witnesses, and a steady parade of former Clintonites before
grand juries. If things get really bad, he can always go to Northern Ireland where
they would canonize him, bless him with sainthood, were sainthood and funny
things of that nature not regarded with deep suspicion by one community, which is
party to a conflict that continues to simmer in water that will not boil.
But back to the chads. The New York Times reports:
Despite the outcry over last year’s presidential election, the next national election will
probably occur under virtually the same circumstances as the last, with the same unreli-
able voting systems and under the same dizzying hodgepodge of rules that vary from
county to county across the nation.
The reasons vary, from a lack of cash to partisan positioning and difficulties in
interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court decision that finally ended the presidential contest.
Those studying to overhaul the system have found that it is exceedingly complex.
”There is no technical fix to the problem,” said Thomas Mann, a scholar at the
Brookings Institution. “There’s no possibility of a uniform national ballot. There are
contradictory findings on the accuracy of different voting equipment.”
And so far there is no money. At a hearing on Capitol Hill, state election officials
painted a bleak picture of the improvements they might be able to achieve by the mid-
term elections in 2002, particularly if Congress and the White House continued to
sidestep the issue. Researchers have reached conflicting conclusions on what technol-
ogy is best. Even if they could agree on a machine with the lowest error rate, would
voters easily adapt? Examinations of ballots in Florida showed that some people failed
to register their choices, whether from ignorance, hostility to the candidates or the sys-
tem.
Moreover, ideas that once seemed panaceas — Internet voting, scrapping the Elec-
toral College, even uniform poll-closing nationwide have been discredited. And those
with a stake in the process — political parties and officials from federal, state, and
county governments — are lapsing into predictable squabbles over advantage and turf.2
And it concludes:
Setting national and state standards for ballots and recounts might have seemed a logical
response to the mess in Florida. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the election
officials are resistant to giving up turf. And untangling the roles of federal, state, and
local officials is emerging as a central obstacle.3
What emerged from the Florida recount was not that the process of voting and
ballot counting was remiss in Florida, but that it was the norm across the country. It
had only come to light in Florida because the stakes were so high. For years, in
other words, we have had a voting system that is undemocratic no matter what yard-
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stick is used, one that would not pass muster in countries undergoing transition to
democratization. In these countries we oversee the process: the registration docu-
ments to prove the voter’s identification; the indelible ink marks on the thumb to
ensure that the voter can only vote once; the close monitoring of the ballot casting to
ensure that voters understand for whom they are voting; the ballots marked with a
simple X alongside the candidate of one’s choice; the deposit of the marked ballots
into the counting boxes that will be sealed in the presence of representatives of all
the parties who participated in the election at the conclusion of the voting process;
the convoys to accompany the boxes that are transported to the designated counting
centers; the overseeing of the opening of the boxes to ensure no fraudulent ballots
were deposited en route or additional “stuffed” ballot boxes winding up in the count-
ing centers; the hand counting of votes, monitored both by “official” observers and
party representatives; the process for dealing with contested ballots. Yes, we are the
self-anointed guardians against hanky-panky. We insist on every single detail of the
process being observed, and then issue reports declaring whether the elections were
fair and free — “free and fair,” of course, according to the standards we have dic-
tated.
We are hypocrites of the first order. As one who has been part of international
election monitoring teams in five countries, I would be ashamed to return to these
countries and tell their election officials that if they were to use the voting and
counting procedures used in the United States, with arbitrary rules, different voting
equipment of different quality in different parts of the country, we would have to
make a judgment that while their elections were free at best, we would be unable to
stamp them with the legitimacy of being fair. We would stigmatize them in the inter-
national community, perhaps “chastise” them for their errant ways by cutting donor
aid or finding some other way to make life more miserable, not for the bureaucrats
who run their independent electoral commissions, but for the great majority of the
uneducated masses who took the pains to learn how to register to vote, how to vote,
and how to acquire the necessary documentation that would certify them as members
of their respective communities.
And yet, in our own backyard, we do not measure up to the values we “impose”
on others. After the brouhaha subsided, we turned a blind eye to the massive imper-
fections in our own systems. What hubris! And what contempt for the voters of this
country! If nothing is done to rectify the glaring flaws in the system in every state of
the union, voter turnouts, already among the lowest in the developed “democracies,”
will plummet. Why bother to vote when your vote may never be tallied? The results
of every election that comes within a mile of being close will be challenged.
Perhaps we should consider taking a leaf out of our own book and ask election
officials from the countries we have been rudely lecturing on democratic practices to
come to the United States and observe our elections to see whether they meet the
criteria that define “free and fair.” But then, damn it, we are the United States: Best,
Biggest, and Brightest, and so what if former presidents Ford and Carter, after ob-
serving Peru’s recent national election, reported that Peru’s voter registration system
was “far superior” to the systems used in the United States.4
II
In a moving and touching event at the John F. Kennedy Library in April, but one
punctuated with humor, much laughter, and the wit that many a roast would envy,
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the Institute presented Dr. Tom Durant, assistant director of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Hospital, with the John Joseph Moakley Award for Distinguished Public
Service. Dr. Durant was honored for his contribution to medical relief efforts among
refugees in more countries than I could list in this space — Rwanda, Cambodia,
Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and the list goes on. There are, according to
Durant, some 66 million refugees in the world, people either internally displaced or
having to flee their countries owing to the calamities of conflict, disease, persecu-
tion, drought, famine, and that list also goes on.
Among the guests in attendance was Dr. Ann Goldfeld, who was singled out by
Dr. Durant for her efforts in the international campaign to ban land mines.
Mention of land mines brought back memories of Angola, a country that is wired
with land mines from Uíge on the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) to Xangongo, close to the border with Namibia.
Many historians believe that the air battle between the Cubans and South Africans
for control of the strategically important town of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, which
South Africa lost to the Cubans in December 1987, inflicted the first dent in the
seemingly invincible South African armor of supremacy. Indeed, the arms embargo
on South Africa can take a good deal of credit for the South African loss. Although
South Africa’s troops, armor, and artillery, the products of its own arms industry,
were the most sophisticated in the region, the South African Defence Force lacked
air supremacy. Angola’s modem MIG fighters, supplied by the Soviet Union and
flown by Cuban pilots, were more than a match for South Africa’s aging Mirages,
which South Africa could neither replace nor refurbish.
Cuito Cuanavale assumed a symbolic significance beyond its strategic value, with
the Cubans vowing to hold it and the South Africans determined to take it. More
than any single battle, Cuito Cuanavale brought South Africa to the negotiating table
and forced it to think in terms of new strategic paradigms. In the settlement that
followed, bringing independence to Namibia in line with Resolution 435 of the
United Nations Security Council, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and
an end to South Africa’s support for Jonas Savimbi’s Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA), the “securocrats” who had dominated South Africa’s
strategic campaign to contain the continuing waves of political unrest in South
Africa’s townships, orchestrated by the black liberation movements to end apartheid,
secure the release of Nelson Mandela, and establish a democratic, nonracial South
Africa, lost both prestige and influence. The diplomats in South Africa’s Department
of Foreign Affairs were catapulted into more prominent and influential positions,
facilitating the talks that ultimately led to Mandela’s release and in 1994 to South
Africa’s ”miracle” election.
I knew I had to go to Cuito Cuanavale, walk the ground of the airstrip, gauge the
width and depth of the Cuito River that had, in 1987, separated the Cubans and
South Africans. The problem was how to get there. The civil war in Angola between
Savimbi’s UNITA and the MPLA government of Jose Eduardo dos Santos was in its
twenty-second year. Both sides could afford to keep the conflict going indefinitely.
UNITA controlled the diamond-rich areas of the country, the government its im-
mense oil reserves. The war had ravaged the country, turning one of Africa’s most
mineral-rich countries into a gigantic pothole and mines were the weapon of choice
in the bush war. As territory exchanged hands, the retreating side randomly scattered
land mines — limpet mines mostly — across the terrain, making pursuit difficult
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and often  impossible.  By the most reliable estimates, some 15 million mines are
buried in Angola’s soil, which amounts to 31 land mines per square mile. Worldwide
there are probably 110 million land mines in 64 countries, but these are only “best”
estimates, since the reality is that no one knows for sure, because no matter how
great the effort to demine — the deminers themselves are the first to admit that their
efforts are largely futile — that for each mine they unearth, at least 10,000 escape
detection.
In Angola, the resources to ferret out the lethal devices are hamstrung by the war
itself. You have the farcical situation where the government pays lip service to the
efforts of the UN to orchestrate minesweeping drives in the hinterlands; yet the
government itself continues to plant mines in the areas it controls. Land mines are
popular because they inflict damage at a minimum cost — between three to ten
dollars to purchase, eight hundred to one thousand dollars to remove.
Mines control people. In the countryside, where most of the fighting, other than
the set ground battles, takes place, the local inhabitants are afraid to step outside
their mud huts because the slightest venture into the open may be one’s last; every
step one takes might trigger the concealed trip wire, and the survivor, if he or she is
lucky, will only lose part of a leg, becoming one more statistic in the catalog of land
mine casualties, one more live cripple.
An immobile population is easy to control; whichever side governs a  particular
area has no fear of locals “siding” with the enemy, of being ambushed when it is
least on guard. The risks make allegiances of that nature foolhardy in the extreme.
Thus, people in villages in the path of war simply switch allegiances, depending on
who their occupiers are —UNITA one day, the MPLA the next. Cease-fires have
been called; settlements brokered; and treaties signed. But all for naught. This war is
about greed and who will hold power — issues of governance are a secondary con-
sideration.
In Luanda, the capital, you begin to get some idea of the devastation the mines
have wrought. Every other person has a stump leg; some hobble along, some ma-
neuver their way using rickety sticks; some crawl or are ferried in homemade carts
by friends. One begins to form the impression that an Angolan with two functioning
legs is either a government bureaucrat or an exception. A crippled society is peopled
with cripples.
Getting to Luanda is not difficult, and I arrive there late in 1997 to stake out my
options. There are daily flights from Johannesburg. Usually one has to make reser-
vations days in advance; in war there is profit, especially when the commodities up
for grabs are diamonds, which must be paid for in hard currency by clandestine
routes, shipments of sophisticated weaponry if you are working with UNITA or to
get access to the potentially rich offshore oil drilling sites that the government is
more than eager to lease to the oil conglomerates, if you are working with the gov-
ernment. The conglomerates dispatch their deal makers, who converge, like vultures,
on Luanda. When the government you are dealing with is among the most corrupt in
the world and everything has a price, you never leave empty-handed if you arrive
with full pockets.
Getting anywhere else in Angola can be a nightmare. Most roads have been de-
stroyed, semi-destroyed, or are impassible. So you try the hitchhike route — by
plane, usually the Hercules 130s that ferry goods across the country, bring supplies
to remote areas, enabling relief organizations to continue with their work. Without
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these huge birds, relief would be impossible to administer and basic supplies would
never reach their intended destinations.
The routine: turn up at Luanda’s international airport, inquire where UN flights
are heading that day, and if you are lucky, they will find space for you somewhere
amid the hundreds of tons of cargo, from motor vehicles to tanks of gasoline,
agricultural appliances, stockpiles of beer, and what appear to be endless stocks of
baby diapers. We (my Portuguese translator and I) luck out. On the second day, a
UN carrier is flying to Huambo, and from Huambo on to Menongue. Flying on a
Hercules is a nonexperience. Because the plane has no windows, one is simply con-
fined to a space that has no point of reference. You can see nothing; hence there is
nothing against which to measure movement. The plane lumbers into the sky with
surprisingly little effort for its gigantic size and payload. But once airborne, one has
the sense of being motionless, of being suspended in space, of things having
stopped. You are not going anywhere because there are no indicators that you are.
The stillness adds to the claustrophobia, the claustrophobia to anxiety.
CARE runs its operations for the province, Cuando Cubango, from Menongue.
White, clean-cut young men and women in their twenties, mostly from France but
with a small contingent of Brits, run the operation. Their function is to provide the
logistical help to facilitate the “professionals” the UN will bring in to identify in
geometrical patterns areas of high mine-risk; they, in turn, are followed by the
minesweepers who clear the designated areas, the “markers” who demarcate the
routes one must follow in order to avoid becoming one more statistic, and finally
CARE workers move into the concentration of small villages that define the area to
“secure “ them, as it were, but with the purpose of teaching the local inhabitants
how to navigate the cleared areas, how to change their behaviors.
The color-coded maps, covering the walls of the CARE HQ, look impressive; the
constant crackle of walkie-talkies conveys the impression of an operation making
headway. One color signifies an area that is highly mined; a second color identifies
areas that have been swept clean, areas that are now open to the local people; but the
third color, red, signifies the vast tracts that are still no-go areas.
Red pins are all over the maps. Unfortunately, because of cutbacks in aid, CARE
will be leaving the area at the end of the year. And unfortunately, too, when you ask
the young, earnest workers whether their presence has made a difference, they hesi-
tate. The task is well beyond their ability to make a significant difference; they lack
the necessary resources, and aid donors increasingly direct aid to areas of interest,
not to the areas of most need. The task itself is impossible — like finding a needle
in a haystack.
But they are most helpful. Within hours, they have found us both a driver who
will take us to Cuito Cuanavale and the skeletal remains of what once was a van to
make the journey; dollars and a bottle of whiskey change hands and we are on our
way. In this part of Angola, hard liquor is a currency as valuable as dollars. The UN
planes bring in supplies of liquor, but they are mostly for members of UNIVEM, the
peacekeeping force that has no peace to keep, leaving local towns that are not in the
“distribution” link without a drop of the hard stuff.
Cuito Cuanavale is about 100 meters from Menongue, but it might as well be a
thousand. There is no road, only a series of craters you gingerly maneuver your way
around. Progress is agonizingly slow, taking us five hours to make the trip. In some
places, the road simply disappears. Locals, who make their living out of this sort of
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thing, appear out of nowhere and come up with wooden planks; makeshift “bridges”
are assembled; more dollars and a little whiskey change hands.
Our anxiety begins to surface. Unless we reach Cuito Cuanavale before nightfall,
we will be stranded. And when night falls, the temperature drops precipitously: Our
clothes are inadequate; we will freeze. The barren wasteland that stretches out on all
sides provides no protection — trees, plants, living things, have been bombed out of
existence. Even the birds have fled. The eerie silence is our only companion; my
imagination creates scenes of battle that littered the countryside with the dead and
left the burnt-out instruments of destruction as testimonials to the fact that once
upon a time people lived in these empty spaces, laughed, cried, and made love.
During the five-hour jolting session not a single vehicle passes us in either direc-
tion. The landscape is strewn with the wreckage of war, downed MIG 28s here, anti-
personnel carriers there, tanks that appear to have run out of petrol all over the
place; most appear to be in good working order, if you forgive them their rustiness.
We begin to joke; maybe we’ll have to try to hole up in an abandoned tank for the
night. UNITA’s or the MPLA’s? Who gives a damn?
But God or the spirits of the ancestors are with us. We reach Cuito Cuanavale at
dusk. It is a traditional African village; fires provide light and heat; children in T-
shirts emblazoned with American slogans for American products they have never
heard of still scamper at play. The huts in which the local population lives are
dilapidated. Most brick buildings have been destroyed; the half-destroyed ones are
still used for “municipal” purposes. There is a small market area; you can walk its
length in five minutes. Unlike marketplaces in other parts of the sub-Sahara, Cuito
Cuanavale’s is unhurried, perhaps because there is so little in the stalls — biscuits, a
few fish, and small assortments of fruit. There is no appearance of “life,” or it es-
capes us.
We move quickly to the compound where we will stay: a small enclosed area at
the perimeter of the village with the flag of the de Beers company at full mast in
case some stranger passing through on his journey to nowhere might not see for
himself the selfless philanthropy of the diamond kings. The camp is self-contained;
insulated tents that are surprisingly comfortable for the minesweepers. This is where
they live and sleep for six months at a stretch or until the boredom or their work
gets to them. There is an electric generator, light at night and fridges to keep the
beer cold.
I have hardly settled in when I hear a gusty voice. “Hi, mate.” A Brit here at the
end of the earth! His name is Alan Calton from Norwich. “How did you end up
here,” I ask him as he opens a couple of ice-cold beers. Simple enough. He was a
minesweeper in the British army, and when he had done his time, he went to work
in the private sector doing what he knew what to do: minesweeping. He works for a
company in London, Greenfields, which specializes in the minesweeping business, a
lucrative one with some 100 million of the deadly buggers to be disposed of. “Did
you ever work in Northern Ireland?” My question is more out of curiosity than any-
thing else. He laughs. Did he ever!
Crossmaglen in County Armagh, close to the border with the Republic, is “bandit
country,” Provo (Provisional IRA) territory, the staging point for IRA operations in
the North. In South Armagh the IRA is among its own people. Hatred of the British
“occupation” unites the people. In the center of Crossmaglen, the Brits had built
their largest fortress, a magnificently ugly barracks that disfigured the town. Its
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sophisticated surveillance equipment would try to pinpoint IRA movements and
move soldiers out to “terminate” the would-be “terrorists.” The fortress was among
the most hated symbols of “British rule” in Northern Ireland, an “up yours!” to the
residents of Crossmaglen who comported in Paddy Shorts’s pub to plan its
demolition over numerous pints of Guinness stout. Indeed, the area was deemed to
be so dangerous that army patrols were limited and the barracks itself was supplied
by helicopter airlifts.
But some things — hard military equipment and the like — could not be airlifted.
Most of the hard equipment had to be brought in by road, and therein lay the prob-
lem: the roads approaching Crossmaglen were the most mined in Northern Ireland,
hence the need for the Alan Caltons of the army.
They were the minesweepers. When shipments of armaments and other heavy-
duty stuff were due, the minesweepers were moved into the Crossmaglen area under
layers of protection. They worked around the clock for seventy-two hours, sweeping
the entire area, destroying or immobilizing mines, hidden homemade bombs (noth-
ing like plain old fertilizer to create an explosive of extreme potency) or anything
that remotely could obstruct the convoy of trucks that immediately followed them,
once their work was done.
After seventy-two hours, the minesweepers were removed from the area, given
twenty-four hours to sleep it off, and quartered back in their barracks until their
services were once again needed. Neither Alan nor his buddies had the slightest idea
why they were in Northern Ireland; to their unpracticed eye it was a case of one
group of bloody Paddys fighting another group of bloody Paddys for reasons they
couldn’t fathom or had no interest in fathoming. They were simple minesweepers,
and Crossmaglen was probably one of the best places for a professional minesweeper
to practice his trade, hone his skills.
We laughed about the absurdity of the situation. I told him how often I had
passed through Crossmaglen, stopped at Paddy Shorts’s, signed his “guest” book for
visitors, downed the creamy pints, and listened to the stories of the local pundits —
often in their seventies but still planning mayhem, probably, I said, against the likes
of himself.
He had a “mission” in the morning. The crew was going to clear an area and I
was welcome to join them if I wished to do so. I wished to do so.
On my way back to my tent, I walked to the outer reach of the encampment.
Nothing but the absoluteness of silence against a star-filled sky, bright enough to
throw shadows of light over the Cuito River, listless and meandering. Beyond the
river was? I would never know. Only that the “road” we had come in on was sup-
posed to struggle on to Mavingo, but the impassable bridge, still not rebuilt since it
had been destroyed in 1987, cut the journey short. Not that it made much difference,
I was told.
The area on that side of the river had not been swept for mines; an attempt to
push farther on would be suicidal. Yet, as I stood in the stillness, nothing moving, I
felt I was in the middle of a false calm. I had forgotten that Cuito Cuanavale had the
unenviable distinction of being one of the most mined areas in the world, and one of
the most forgotten. Sure, Alan and his team could save some legs, but their contract
expired at the end of the year and it wasn’t quite clear yet whether the UN could
provide the funding necessary to keep the operation going. He intended to return to
his wife and kids for a couple of months and then take on another assignment in one
more godforsaken spot. That’s how he earned his living. Crossmaglen with a twist.
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By 1997 the course of the war in Angola had made Cuito Cuanavale strategically
unimportant for both sides; neither journalists nor TV crews saw much value in
featuring it in their stories; besides the fact that it was difficult to get to, had no
amenities, no hotels, no watering holes or even a place to eat, would turn it into a
one-day venture at best because it would be even more difficult to get out of, given
that night was an enemy with which they could not contend.
We set out at 8:00 A.M. Alan and the others are different now. This is business
and they never lose sight of the fact that it is dangerous work, that the slightest mis-
take on the part of one can damage the lives of all, that focus, concentration, and
punctilious attention to detail, to remembering that the repetition of what they had
done so many times made it easy to let the mind wander, and that was the kiss of
death. Conversation is terse. No idle chatter. Each step of the operation is checked
and then rechecked; equipment is tested to ensure no malfunctions; the room for
error, misunderstanding, and miscalculation is methodically eliminated.
We approach the “identified” area. The one imperative: go slowly; impatience is
deadly. They work in two teams, each team consisting of two people. One does the
demining, the other acts as an observer making sure the deminer is observing all
procedures correctly. They switch roles regularly. This morning the teams will de-
stroy the mines manually.
They use pointed metal probes and trowels and work within a one-meter lane that
has been predetermined. The metal probes pierce the ground at an angle of approxi-
mately 30 degrees to a minimum depth of 15 centimeters in maximum increments of
5 centimeters. Horizontal and forward progress intervals never exceed the minimum
surface area of the smallest mine likely to be discovered in the clearance area. Alan’s
teams play it safe: they proceed at intervals of 3 centimeters, ensuring that the small-
est mines will be detected by the probe. When a mine is discovered it is removed
ever so carefully with the hand or trowel before the depth of excavation is increased.
Whenever one of their probes makes contact with an object, the ground beneath it is
again ever so carefully removed using the probes and fingers until the object is re-
moved. They check ever so carefully for any attached trip wires and particularly for
other devices buried below the exposed mine. They destroy a mine by placing an
explosive adjacent to it. They insert a detonator in the explosive, which is attached
to a length of fuse. We move back a safe distance and Alan detonates the charge —
as the teams’ leader, he reserves to himself the right to detonate.5 The others call him
a bloody fascist.
And so the morning wears on. The sun is hot; the pace of progress enough to try
one’s patience. At noon Alan calls it quits for the day. In the business, concentration
is essential; once it begins to flag it’s time to call a halt. Time for a couple of cold
beers. The morning’s “take”: four limpet mines; at this rate Alan will clear the area
three centuries hence.
Given the concentration of the mines, the idea is not to clear an area in the full
meaning of the word but to cut a safe path through an area, to create “safe” routes
that people can travel through, even though adjacent areas might be teeming with
mines. The “safe” lanes are about fifty paces in width. The mined areas that buttress
them are fenced in. Thus, what is called “marking.” The use of markers is pivotal.
Here they use red and white poles. Red is the safe side, white the danger side.
“Marking” has a direct impact in reducing risk to the community by making risk
areas clearly visible.
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In the afternoon, we participate in a ritual of sorts. A safe lane has been cut
through a minefield. But the local people don’t quite believe it is safe until they see
others use it. What counts in marking is that the community recognizes the perim-
eter of a minefield and the consequences of crossing markers. So Alan and his team
and several CARE workers and I, at their invitation, link hands and walk the length
of the lane together. Nothing explodes; the local people who gathered to watch ap-
plaud. Time for another cold beer. One small victory for Anna Goldfeld.
Later, we watch a pantomime. The CARE workers use it to teach children how to
avoid risk areas and how to use the safe lanes, with a premium on their not straying
off the marked lanes. Everyone in the village watches the pantomime; there is much
laughter and applause, and as children play different roles or are asked to imitate the
actions of the CARE workers, you can see them preen with pride. There’s no value
we can put on the worth of a little recognition.
Eventually, I got to the airstrip, but that is another story.
III
The back down by the pharmaceutical companies on making the drugs used to con-
coct drug cocktails to treat HIV/ AIDS available to countries in the sub-Sahara at
enormously reduced prices is being heralded as some kind of breakthrough. That it
is, but a breakthrough that comes with a lot of assumptions.
More access to drugs will postpone the inevitable for a while, but drugs do noth-
ing for prevention. Unless there is a massive campaign to underscore this difference,
prevention programs may suffer as more African men assume there is no need to use
condoms, now that the “miracle” drugs are being made available.6
Moreover, access to free drugs in Africa is not the problem. How they are admin-
istered is.
Dr. Richard D’Aquila, one of the most prominent experts in the field of drug
therapy has warned:
People taking anti-HIV medications must be careful to take every dose of their medi-
cines, to take them at the correct times and in the correct manner, and to store the medi-
cines properly to maintain the concentration of drugs in the drug stream to fully control
viral replication. The single most important thing a patient can do to avoid drug
resistance is to be faithful to his or her drug regimen.7
If one applies these criteria to Africa, the conclusions are not all that encouraging.
There are no public health systems remotely capable of delivering, administering,
monitoring, and evaluating the impact of either making drugs available at lower
prices or free of cost. In the sub-Sahara, where more than 70 percent of HIV-in-
fected people live, many in unimaginatively squalid conditions, there are no trained
personnel to train staff who would ensure that drugs are being used properly.
We assume that people know how to tell the time — or pay attention to time. Or
that their concepts of time are the same as ours. We assume that AIDS patients can
master the combinations of drugs they must take at specifically designated times,
some with food, some without — not a problem for the starving — some during the
day and some during the night. We assume that adequate storage facilities are avail-
able.
We assume that there will be no black market in drug dealing. We assume that
there will be no corruption. We assume that the crime syndicates that proliferate
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throughout Africa and are often more efficient than many of the continent’s govern-
ments won’t want their piece of the “action.” We assume that a network of clinics,
pharmacies, laboratories, doctors, nurses, and paramedics will mystically materialize
in rural and urban areas, tailored to the specific needs of each and within easily
available transport  routes. We assume adequate transport routes.
We assume efficient supervision, continuous monitoring, and professional evalua-
tions. We assume an adequately minimal supply of doctors — Ethiopia, not an iso-
lated example, has 4 doctors for every 100,000 people; the United States has 245 per
100,000.
We assume patients’ cooperation. We assume that patients will stick with it when
every cocktail will leave them sick and exhausted, and half ready to throw in the
towel. (Did you know that here, in the United States, 80 percent adherence to drug
regimens is the best that can be expected, even among the best educated, most moti-
vated patients?)8
We assume that people can differentiate among colors (in the Xhosa language the
word for green and blue is the same). We assume that the deeply ingrained stigmas
that accompany public knowledge of one’s HIV status will inexplicably disappear.
We assume a mysterious end to prejudice. We assume radical changes in tradition,
local cultures, and the role of traditional medicine.
We assume that governments can establish sophisticated networks of interrelated
activities that must function in synchronization, which in the sub-Sahara is more
than asking a lot. It’s asking the impossible. We assume a degree of political leader-
ship that is flagrantly absent — pusillanimous leaders in some countries no longer
advertise condom use because of pressure from religious leaders who see these ad-
vertisements as sanction for sex. We assume governments that will not turn down
opportunities for access to cheaper drugs, or that issue ridiculous reports in which
“eminent” members make stupid statements that AIDS would disappear if afflicted
countries just stopped testing for HIV.
We assume that the West will kick in with the necessary resources to get some-
thing substantial off the ground, that consumers here will foot the bill for the
world’s R&D so that drugs can be sold far more cheaply in Africa, a far-off place
that is to most people a basket case. We assume that “sacrifices” of this nature will
be politically acceptable in rich countries, especially in the miserly United States.
And I could go on.
I hope you enjoy this issue of the New England Journal of Public Policy. I bring
two articles to your attention: Richard Card’s “Very Like a Whale” and Gabriel
O’Malley’s “An Effective Compromise: Class-Based Affirmative Action in Boston
Schools.” Card will contribute to the journal regularly. O’Malley, as you Sherlock-
Holmes-like types might deduce, is a relative, a nephew in fact. But since we Irish,
as you all know, are notoriously given to the practice of nepotism, who am I to do a
good prejudice an injustice? Besides, how could we live without access to the merits
of stereotyping?
P.S.: As we go to press, the media report that Florida has enacted legislation that
will do away with hanging, butterfly ballots, and questions about determining voter
intent. It will also require that ballots in extremely close elections be recounted by
*   *   *
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hand. The new legislation will replace the old punch-card voting system with
optical scanning systems and touch-screen technologies. It will also create provi-
sional ballots to prevent disenfranchising citizens who are wrongly removed from
the rolls.
Hallelujah!
Only another forty-nine states to go!
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